Content introduction：

No. E2020006

Can a New Model of Infrastructure Financing Mitigate Credit Rationing in Poorly Governed Countries?

 

Jiajun Xu, Xinshun Ru, Pengcheng Song

 

 

Abstract:

We explore why resource-financed infrastructure—whereby developing countries pledge future resource revenues to repay infrastructure loans—mitigates credit rationing in poorly governed countries. Using a novel project-level database, we find that the loan sizes for resource-financed infrastructure are much larger than those determined by the traditional government infrastructure purchasing model especially in poorly governed countries. We use the credit rationing model to explain these empirical patterns. The traditional government infrastructure purchasing model suffers from two limitations: the borrowing government may steal infrastructure funds, or fail to make a credible commitment to using taxation to repay its sovereign infrastructure loans. The new financing model solves such problems by allocating loans directly from the lender to the contractor minimizing government corruption, and channeling resource revenues into an independent escrow account to repay infrastructure loans. Our findings highlight that this new infrastructure financing model can alleviate credit rationing in poorly governed, resource-rich countries.

 

Keywords: Infrastructure financing; Resource-financed infrastructure; Development banks; Public infrastructure; Credit rationing

 

JEL Classification: H54, G23, C61

 

The series of New Structural Economics Working Papers aims to encourage academic scholars and students from all over the world to conduct academic research in the field of new structural economics. Excellent papers are selected irregularly and are offered academic suggestions and recommendation, but the published working papers are not intended to represent official communication from INSE.

The Present Paper was approved by the NSE C3 Development Financing Group.