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The coercive power of mafia reputation on inter- firm interactions


Time: 15:00-16:30, Sept. 23rd, 2022

Platform: Zoom

Speaker: Marta Degl’Innocenti

(University of Milan)

Link: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/81626164288?pwd=Zmp1VG41dXF0by9UZTBRVkxSbjJWZz09

Meeting ID: 816 2616 4288

Passcode: inse



Organized crime represents a pervasive threat to countries worldwide. Yet, it is difficult to underpin how organized crime can jeopardize firms’ relationships and economic transactions in the legal economy. We explore this issue by analyzing to what extent firms’ behavior can be distorted due to the perceived threat of coercive actions from mafia-type organizations. We document that firms with top executives that have a mafia surname receive a greater trade credit extension than other similar firms. Reallocation of resources due to mafia reputation has relevant consequences for the real economy.





Professor Marta Degl’Innocenti is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods in Milan. She is a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (HEA) in the UK. Previously she held an academic position as Associate Professor of Finance at Southampton Business School (UK). Her main research interests are in empirical corporate finance, including banks, lending, executive board composition, trade credit, and mutual fund management. Her work has been published in international academic journals (such as the Journal of Corporate FinanceResearch PolicyJournal of Banking and FinanceEuropean Journal of Operational Research). She obtained her PhD in Finance from University of Bologna in Italy in 2011.