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【11.24讲座】Xu Tian: Corporate Governance, Managerial Compensation, and Disruptive Innovations
2017-11-21
Corporate Governance, Managerial Compensation, and Disruptive Innovations
时间：2017年11月24日下午16:00-17:30
地点：朗润园万众楼一层小教室
主持人：王勇、王歆、夏俊杰
主讲人：Xu Tian（University of Toronto）
【摘要】
Whether a CEO manages the innovation efforts of the firm in line with shareholder preferences has a substantial impact on market value and firm growth, which in turn influence aggregate productivity growth and welfare. Using data on U.S. public firms, we find that (i) firms with better corporate governance tend to adopt highly incentivized contracts rich in stock options; and (ii) such contracts are more likely to lead to disruptive innovations – patented inventions that are in the upper tail of the distribution in terms of quality and originality. We develop and estimate a new dynamic general equilibrium model of firm-level innovation with agency frictions and endogenous determination of executive contracts. The model is used to study the joint dynamics of corporate governance, managerial compensation, and disruptive innovations. Better corporate governance can reduce the influence of the CEO in the determination of the compensation structure. This leads to more incentivized contracts and boosts innovation, with substantial benefits for the shareholders, as well as the broader economy through knowledge spillovers. The estimated model is used to gauge the impact of shutting down the agency frictions. We calculate an upper bound of 1.17% increase in long-run output growth, which translates into a welfare gain as high as 20% in consumption equivalent terms.
【主讲人】
Xu Tian is an Assistant Professor of Financial Economics at the University of Toronto. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester in 2016. His research focuses on financial economics and macroeconomics, with particular emphasis on dynamic structural models of corporate finance and macro-finance. His current projects study the macroeconomic consequences of financial frictions and agency frictions via their roles in shaping the investment and financing decisions of firms and financial institutions.